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SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
VOLUNTARY NONSUIT OR DISMISSAL
The rule in South Carolina as to a voluntary nonsuit used
to be that a plaintiff in a law case had an absolute right be-
fore delivery or publication of the verdict to take that step.
Usher v. Sibley (1806), 2 Brev. 32. But later the rule was
changed so that, if a counterclaim was pled, then such abso-
lute right was gone. Inman v. Hodges (1908), 80 S. C. 455,
61 S. E. 958. The latest decisions by reiteration leave no doubt
that a plaintiff has no such absolute right now. Unless the
adversary consents, a motion must now be made for such
voluntary nonsuit or dismissal, and whether or not it should
be granted is entirely in the judge's discretion.
Rormanus v. Biggs et al. (1950), 217 S. C. 77, 59 S. E. 2d
645, gives a comprehensive view of the subject from the stand-
point of both law and equity. As said therein beginning on
page 85:
This being a suit in equity, Boulknd v. Coerpin, 27 S. C.
235, 3 S. E. 219; Romanus v. Biggs et al., 214 S. C. 145,
51 S. E. (2d) 503, and motions for nonsuit not being
entertained or granted in suits in equity, Jefferson Stand-
ard Life Ins. Co. v. Boddie et al., 202 S. C. 1, 23 S. E.
(2d) 817, it may be that Respondent's motion and the
Court's order thereon are not technically accurate in re-
ferring to the motion as a motion for a voluntary non-
suit. It has been held that there is a distinction between
a discontinuance and a nonsuit, 27 C. J. S., Dismissal and
Nonsuit, §§ 2 and 3, but the result being the same and the
distinction being wholly technical and unimportant we
have no hesitation in treating respondent's motion as a
motion to discontinue.
It has long been the rule that motions to discontinue
in equity cases are addressed to the discretion of the
Court and will be refused when discontinuance will work
prejudice to the defendant, but at one time the rule
was otherwise as to actions at law, in which a plaintiff
was permitted to discontinue or take a nonsuit as a mat-
ter of right. However, dissatisfaction arose with this
wholly artificial distinction, and the well settled rule now
is that motions to discontinue are addressed to the dis-
cretion of the Court both in suits in equity and in actions
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at law. State v. Southern Ry. Co., 82 S. C. 12, 62 S. E.
1116.
At one time it was also apparently thought that the
granting of a motion for a voluntary nonsuit or a dis-
continuance made after the commencement of the trial
rested within the discretion of the Court, but that a
plaintiff was entitled as a matter of absolute right to
the granting of such a motion if made before trial. The
syllabus of the case of Cunningham v. Independence Ins.
Co., 182 S. C. 520, 189 S. E. 800, appears to indicate that
this is the rule in South Carolina, but we think due con-
sideration of the case will show that it does not so hold
and that the syllabus is not justified and is misleading.
In any event the question is put at rest by the later
case of Parnell v. Powel et al., 191 S. C. 159, 3 S. E. (2d)
801, 802, in which the true rule is thus stated: "From
a review of our own decisions and those from other
jurisdictions, we are unable to perceive any sound reason
for holding that a plaintiff has an absolute right to take
a voluntary nonsuit before trial, irrespective of a showing
of substantial prejudice by the defendant. In our opinion,
the Court should exercise its discretion in passing upon
such motions, whether made prior to the commencement
of the trial or after the trial has been entered upon."
The exercise of the Court's discretion to refuse a
motion for a voluntary nonsuit or a discontinuance is
perhaps usually invoked in those cases where the defend-
ant has set up a counterclaim or asked for affirmative
relief, and it has been somewhat debated by appellants
and respondent as to whether the affirmative defense
contained in the answer of the defendant D. F. Biggs,
individually and doing business as Biggs Wholesale
Liquors, and therein designated as a counterclaim, is in
reality a counterclaim, but we do not think that the de-
termination of this question is necessary or even of any
special importance in the decision of this case. The vital
question here, as in all cases of this character, is whether
defendants will suffer prejudice by the discontinuance.
[Cases cited.]
See Moore v. So. Coatings Chem. Co. (1952), 221 S. C. 522,
71 S. E. 2d 311, which also calls attention to the fact that
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when a voluntary nonsuit is granted within the court's dis-
cretion, the situation is then as if no action had been brought.
The plaintiff, upon payment of accrued costs under circuit
court Rule 59, can bring a similar action.
3
Whaley: Voluntary Nonsuit Or Dismissal
Published by Scholar Commons, 1959
